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By K. J. Williams*
The Quandary of the Hospital
Administrator in Dealing with the
Medical Malpractice Problem
I. INTRODUCTION
To appreciate the hospital administrator's quandary in dealing
with the medical malpractice problem, it is first essential to under-
stand the purpose and functions of the hospital medical staff organ-
ization. It was first established in 1919 by the American College
of Surgeons' to eliminate unnecessary surgery and fee splitting
and to prevent unqualified physicians from doing surgery.2 Its
raison d'etre was to upgrade the quality of medical care in the
hospital by serving as a quality control mechanism since there were
no other groups able to function in this capacity. County, state
and national medical organizations have no demonstrable track
record in this area. And, whereas specialty associations and medi-
cal schools greatly contribute to the establishment of standards,
they have little, if any, role in reviewing, analyzing, evaluating and
enforcing compliance in individual institutions with those stand-
ards. Legally constituted state disciplinary bodies, whose prime
objective presumably is public safety, for the large part have dis-
mal records" in exercising disciplinary action. Disciplinary action
per se is not necessarily a measure of quality, but its absence raises
doubts about the degree of quality control being exercised since
one can hardly trust a silent system. The Health Maintenance
Organization ("HMO") 4 and Professional Standards Review Organ-
* K.J. Williams, M.D., F.A.C.P. is President of K.J. Williams & Asso-
ciates, Inc., a private consulting firm specializing in medical staff
management and board, administration, medical staff relationships.
For reprints, address the author at 4205 Big Ranch Road, Napa, Calif.
94558.
1. L. DAVIS, FELLOWSHIP OF SURGEONs-A HISTORY OF THE AmVIEImcAN
COLLEGE OF SURGEONS 221 (1960).
2. See Williams, Medical Staff Issues-Past and Present, 1 HospiTAL
MEDIcAL STAF 3 (1972).
3. See How Well Does Medicine Police Itself?, MEDIcAL ROLD NEWs,
March 15, 1974, at 62.
4. HMOs were first promoted in 1970 by federal government health
strategists with the intent of broadening the availability of and ac-
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ization ("PSRO")r- have not been on the scene long enough to
demonstrate whether they are capable of exerting meaningful con-
tinuing quality control. Therefore, with the exception of the few
closed-panel, prepayment group practice plans, such as Kaiser
Permanente and The Health Insurance Plan of New York, the
voluntary community hospital is virtually the only locus6 for on-
going quality control of medical care.
The ability of the average hospital medical staff organization
to fulfill its original purpose of ensuring that the safety and inter-
est of the patients take precedence over all other concerns has been
and is being seriously questioned. The organization's effectiveness
in identifying less-than-ideal patterns of practice which, through
corrective measures, could be prevented from developing into pro-
fessional obsolescence and gross incompetence, has been thrown into
serious question by the horror stories revealed in such widely pub-
licized cases as Darling v. Charleston Memorial Hospital,7 Zimbel-
man v. Purcell & Tuscon General Hospital," and Gonzales v. Nork &
Mercy Hospital.9 These cannot be dismissed as rare and isolated
cessibility to comprehensive health care programs for the general
public. See The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, §§ 3,4;
42 U.S.C. §§ 280c, 300e note (1973).
5. PSROs, legislated by the Social Security Amendments of 1973, were
designed to ensure that health care services provided to patients by
federal health care programs are medically necessary, meet profes-
sionally recognized standards of quality care and are provided in a
setting consistent with professionally recognized standards of quality
care. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-20.
6. While medical schools, professional specialty societies and local,
state, and national medical associations all contribute to the estab-
lishment of professional standards, they have no system or authority
for determining the extent to which practicing physicians adhere to
those standards, or for gaining compliance with those standards.
7. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
8. 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972). This case and others focus
upon the fundamental question of who is responsible for the tragic
results suffered by patients because of medical incompetence. From
them has developed the concept that the hospital boards of trustees
have a corporate responsibility for the quality of medical care ren-
dered in the hospitals. See Southwick, The Hospital As An Insti-
tution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationships With
The Staff Physician, 9 CALi. WEsT N L. REv. 429, 450 (1973).
9. Unreported memorandum decision of a superior court, Sacramento,
California, Dec. 1973. Discussed in MEDICAL WORLD NEWs, March
15, 1974, at 62. This case, widely publicized in both medical, hospital,
and lay press, exposed a parade of patients who were crippled by one
man's incompetence and unnecessary surgery. It served to reinforce
the general impression that medical staffs do not sufficiently or ade-
quately police their ranks, and to strengthen the concept that an in-
stitution's board and management do indeed have a responsibility to
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cases. The President of the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, in discussing Nork and other cases stated: "I have over
five hundred similar horror stories from our A.T.L.A. News Letter
*..."10 This writer concurs regarding the abundance of such
stories, having had frequent contact with them in his consulting
practice.
Further substantiation for the view that the hospital medical
staff organizations have difficulty in ensuring patient safety is
found in the reported findings of two recently released studies deal-
ing with the quality of surgical care. A House subcommittee report 1
states that in 1974, 2,380,000 unnecessary surgical procedures were
performed with approximately 11,900 deaths resulting from such
surgery. The tenth segment SOSSUS 12 report, entitled "The
Critical Incident Study of Surgical Deaths and Complications,
1973-1975,"'13 strikes a similarly dismal and discouraging note. It
studied 95 hospitals and concluded that close to 50 per cent of the
complications associated with surgery were preventable, as were 35
per cent of the 245 reported deaths.
The foregoing facts raise serious questions about the effective-
ness of the typical hospital medical staff organization as a quality
control mechanism. The architects of the PSRO legislation obvi-
ously concluded that the organization was neither willing to nor
capable of exercising quality control. This is evidenced by their
decision to shift the locus of such control from within the hospital,
to an agency outside of the hospital.
It should be asked if there can indeed be meaningful and effec-
tivel peer review within the framework of the average medical staff
organization, in view of the way it presently relates to the total
hospital organization. Yet, as critical as we may be of its perform-
ance in policing its ranks, the hospital medical staff organization
is presently the only major mechanism which conducts on-going
review, analysis and evaluation of clinical performance against pre-
make sure that there are effective quality control systems. A state
appellate court has recently ordered a new trial in this case since Dr.
Nork was deprived of his right to a jury trial. See The Register,
Napa, Calif., at 2, Aug. 6, 1976.
10. Cartwright, Change The Tort System?, MEDIcAL. WORLD Nzws, Sept.
8, 1975, at 62.
11. SuBcommrr= oN OvERsIGHT Am IxvESTIaATiON OF THE HousE INTER-
STATE AxD FOREIGN CoMMERcE CoMMITTEE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., COST
ANiD QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE: UNNECESSARY SURGERY (Jan., 1976) (as
reported in PSRO LETrER, Feb. 1, 1976).
12. AmERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS AND THE AMERICAN SURGICAL Asso-
cIATioN, STUDY ON SURGICAL SERwcES FOR THE Um'rx STATES (SOSSUS)
(1975).
13. As reported in MEDICAL WoRLD NEWS, Jan. 25, 1976, at 24.
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determined standards, and then in accordance with its findings,
recommends corrective measures to assure that the safety of the
patient has first attention and that he receives the appropriate
quality of care.
The hospital medical staff organization is part and parcel of the
total hospital organization.14 It is not a separate entity but very
much part of the legally constituted hospital corporation, having
been created by the board of the corporation. In practical terms,
it is an organizational extension of the board carrying out the neces-
sary quality control functions which are supposed to be, and should
be, determined by the board. The board, however, must inevitably
render public accountability' 5 as to whether those functions have
or have not been effectively discharged. Thus it is obvious that
the medical staff organization, its purposes, structure and functions,
cannot be divorced from the governance and management of the
institution. For this reason, the hospital administrator is con-
fronted almost daily with some aspect of the quality control func-
tions that a medical staff organization is supposed to discharge.
However, the impact or influence he/she has on those functions is
questionable.
II. THE QUANDARY
With the medical staff organization being such an integral part
of the total hospital organization and with the administrator hav-
ing been formally trained as a professional manager and serving
as the board's representative in charge of the operation of the
institution, it seems logical to assume that he would be the person
responsible for seeing that the quality control functions were prop-
erly carried out by the medical staff. Certainly, one would assume
that the administrator, as the institution's expert in management
and organization, would have as his first and foremost concern the
patient's interests and safety and the quality of patient care in the
institution. Most administrators do have these concerns and usu-
ally have no problem in dealing with those aspects of patient care
that do not directly involve physicians. However, the major com-
ponent of patient care is medical care, and when the administrator
becomes involved in this area, i.e., by getting the board to promul-
gate policies dealing with controls and by making sure that medical
staff officials carry out those policies and that predetermined pro-
fessional standards are adhered to by the members of the medical
staff, then they encounter a mountain of political, administrative
14. See Southwick, supra note 8, at 436-40 which succinctly sets forth
the legal basis for this statement.
15. Williams, Beyond Responsibility: Toward Accountability, 53 Hospi-
TAL PROGRESS 44 (1972).
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and personal problems related directly to the board's uncertainty
about acting in this area and to resistance from the medical staff.
The responsibilities of the administrator, as the board's legal
representative and manager of the total institution, are usually set
forth in his position description as well as in the hospital's corpor-
ate by-laws. It is logical to assume from reading these documents
that he is to be responsible for managing and coordinating all the
institution's resources and for seeing to it that the functions of
management are applied to all components of the total hospital
organization. Tables of organization usually validate this assump-
tion. Newer titles, such as executive director, executive vice
president, president of the corporation, chief executive officer,
which have replaced that of "administrator," reflect the responsi-
bilities he is assumed to have. However, when the administrator
seeks to discharge certain responsibilities, generally speaking, he
finds that he does not have authority vis-A-vis quality control;
and if he and his board think that he does have it, the medical
staff does not. If he attempts to exercise this authority, he does
so knowing full well that in any ensuing conflict he will probably be
the loser. His own sense of survival (titles and presumed authority
notwithstanding) dictates that he stay out of medical staff activi-
ties. Fuchs puts it in perspective when he states: "From the point
of view of the hospital administrator, running a hospital is like
trying to drive a car when the passengers have control of the wheel
and the accelerator. The most the administrator can do is occasion-
ally jam on the brakes."'16 His position is akin to that ascribed
to a drama critic by the late Irish poet Brendan Behan-"he is like
a eunuch in a harem; he knows what should be done, but he can't
do much about it." Herein lies the quandary of the hospital
administrator when he comes to deal with aspects of the malprac-
tice crisis that affect his hospital. Some of the actions (and
inactions) that result from this will now be examined.
The grossly incompetent physician does not develop overnight.
While some major act of incompetence (and attendant tragedy)
brings him and his work into question, usually it comes to light
that there has been a pattern developing for years. There may
have been a number of acts of gross incompetence, maybe without
tragedy, or various staff committees may have expressed concern
over the physician's refusal to abide by hospital regulations as evi-
denced by: perennially delinquent records; failure to seek other
opinions in cases with diagnoses in doubt; writing pre-operative
history and physical examinations at the last minute after the
patient has been preoperatively medicated; the fact that some one
16. V.R. Fucus, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOAInCS AND SOCIAL
CHoIcE 58 (1974).
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"a couple of years ago" from the executive committee may have
"spoken" to him without there being follow-up or documentation
or that in the past year it may have been mentioned that eventu-
ally his privileges would have to be cut back. In these situations
there is practically always an antecedent pattern, and that pattern,
while not readily acknowledged by physicians in positions of
authority, is nonetheless usually known to them.
The administrator, the one person who should be acquainted
with that developing pattern, is often not aware of it. Yet he should
be and he should also be the one to insist upon corrective measures
being instituted because he has closer contact with more sources
of information than any other individual in the institution: the
nursing service in the emergency department, patient care floors,
and operating rooms, as well as through the nursing director;
the medical records department personnel; members of administra-
tion who sit in on various meetings of quality control committees
of the medical staff; physicians who will come directly to him
(although on a "confidential" basis) to tell of some preventable inci-
dent concerning another member of the staff; the various key offi-
cials on the staff; and his own observations at medical meetings
when such incidents may be discussed.
With respect to incidents involving patient safety and quality
control, such as the physician's refusing to adhere to hospital policy
or professional standards agreed to by his confreres or practising
beyond his skill level, or physicians with a drinking problem, some
pertinent questions arise. Can the administrator insist that medical
staff officials take corrective action? The answer is that he can,
but only to the extent that he does not come into confrontation
with the medical staff, because when he does, he is automatically
in a win-lose situation and he is the expendable party. Should the
administrator report the incident to his board? He can (and
should), but here too, there is a tolerance level. If the members
of the board are not tuned in to the extent of their corporate
responsibility, as many trustees are not, then they will not be recep-
tive to such problems because correcting them means conflict with
the whole medical staff or with those officials who are thought to
have the responsibility for this kind of problem. Because of the
pressures applied to the board by the staff, coupled with the custo-
mary charges levelled against the administrator of "interference
with medical practice," the administrator can be cut to ribbons in
no time.
Trying to cope with quality control problems is but one manifes-
tation of the administrator's quandary. Another more frustrating
aspect of the problem is his knowledge that the quality control
mechanism, i.e., the medical staff organization, which has been set
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up to take care of quality control, is usually not structured so it
can do so. The following examples substantiate this contention.
The responsibilities of key staff officials, such as the chief of
staff and clinical department chairman, are usually not spelled out
in any detail, and the authority necessary for the adequate dis-
charge of the responsibility is not defined in medical staff by-laws.
In fact, to have descriptions for those positions is the exception.
What frequently happens is that responsibility and authority are
diffused and diluted throughout committees of the medical staff
rather than being pinpointed in certain officials. Accordingly, that
which is everyone's business becomes no one's business for if re-
sponsibility is not carefully pinpointed, accountability cannot be
exacted.
Carrying out quality control is also affected by the time honored
"musical chairs" approach to medical staff leadership, wherein the
chief of staff and department chairmen are in office for only one
or two years. Not only does this mitigate against organizational
stability, but it commonly precludes staff leaders from seeing
developing patterns of medical incompetence. Another troubling
aspect in medical staff leadership is the method whereby key offi-
cials arrive in office. It is usually done by election without any
attempt to determine or set criteria for the management compe-
tency required for the office. It is as though there were an a priori
assumption that all physicians have management skills and organ-
izational ability or that having strong clinical skills somehow
assures one of a monopoly on management skills. Such assump-
tions have been disproven time and again.
While the administrator is supposed to see that management
functions (planning, organizing, staffing, directing, controlling) are
implemented throughout the entire institution, he knows full well
that they will not necessarily apply to the medical staff organiza-
tion, the single most important component of the total hospital
organization. Furthermore, if he tries to do much about the situa-
tion, he will often find himself in confrontation with the medical
staff.
The very important management function of staffing presents
another problem for the administrator. Neither he as the "corpora-
tion's general manager" nor the board can designate who will fill
those key quality control positions. Organized medicine vehem-
ently contends that this is the prerogative of the medical staff.
They regard it as being necessary to preserve the democratic func-
tion. In so doing, they lose sight of the purpose of the hospital
and the purposes of the medical staff organization, i.e., to serve as
a quality control mechanism and not as a model of democracy. It
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is also difficult to comprehend how a trustee with a sense of his
corporate responsibility could fail to insist that his representative,
the administrator, be involved in the selection of the key guardian
officials of the medical staff and that those officials come into office
on a basis other than popularity. Failing to assure themselves that
those who fill these positions (the ones to whom the board delegates
authority) have been carefully selected in accordance with general-
ly accepted and proven management procedures seems tantamount
to abdicating their responsibility. With respect to this important
function of staffing, the old adage that says the party who is to be
held responsible must have control over that for which he is to be
held responsible is lost. This particular area is a very sensitive
one 17 and the administrator who attempts to effect change in it can
find that it is a battleground on which his demise may occur.
The quandary of the administrator regarding medical malprac-
tice extends beyond just having to deal with actual or possible
quality control problems in the hospital. It also influences his
external relationships. More than one administrator has said to
me:
I have to sit here, be pleasant and smile to the members of the staff,
and actually cooperate with them, while they make arrangements to
withhold their services. And I have to do this knowing they are
the highest paid members on the health care team and that in the
process of the walk out, some of the lowest paid members of the
health care team will be penalized, and that there will be a meas-
urable and deleterious impact on the bottom line of our operation.
And on top of that, I must welcome them back with a smile!
The administrator also faces a dilemma when he talks patients
into signing a binding arbitration agreement 8 upon their admis-
sion into the hospital. In essence this is getting patients to
surrender their civil rights, and at the time they are being admitted
to the hospital, they and their next of kin are not prepared to com-
prehend fully what they are signing away. This hardly seems
consonant with the hospital's avowed purpose of putting patients'
interests first. Bush states it well when he says: "Encouraging
patients to sign the contract, therefore, comes perilously close to
exploiting patient trust and dependency in an undisclosed conflict
of interest."'" But if the administrator did oppose such a move
and recommended to his board that the hospital not be a party
17. Wall Street Journal, July 31, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
18. A patient agrees to submit any malpractice dispute to arbitration and
to be bound by the findings, thus foregoing his rights of bringing suit
against the physician or the hospital.
19. Bush, Is Arbitration the Answer to Malpractice Disputes?, MEDICAL
WORLD NEWS, Jan. 26, 1975, at 46.
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to encouraging patients to sign binding arbitration agreements, he
would undoubtedly incur the wrath of his medical staff and destroy
his effectiveness in the process.
Another dimension of his quandary involves what he is to do
when he knows that a patient has suffered a misadventure at the
hands of a member of the medical staff who sees no need to inform
the patient of this. Should the administrator tell the patient or
his next of kin (or insist that the physician do so)? If he does,
he must be prepared to withstand the ire of the medical staff and
the board if litigation ensues. Consider the case of a young man
in his late teens who had no known genito-urinary disease and was
"routinely" catheterized anyway. The incompetent physician (in-
competent on numerous occasions apart from this incident) terribly
traumatized the urethra so that the young man had to be trans-
fused. Should that patient have been advised of the unnecessary
misadventure and possible debilitating complications later in life?
This consultant advised the board and that administrator that they
should ascertain the exact extent of the injury from the appropri-
ate specialists and then make sure that the patient was advised.
Needless to say, this recommendation was not greeted with enthusi-
asm. It was regarded as akin to asking them to commit suicide.
However, if the purpose of the hospital is to ensure that the
patient's safety and interests have top priority, a hospital and its
officials can do no less in such a situation. Admittedly, this is a
somewhat new20 and disturbing thought to the administrator; but
it is a dimension of his quandary vis-a-vis the medical malpractice
problem that he will have to cope with eventually.
III. REASONS FOR THE QUANDARY
This quandary actually involves much more than just territorial
imperatives of the hospital's chief executive officer. It creates an
organizational schizophrenia 21 in the total hospital organization.
The prime reason it exists and persists is because the roles, relation-
ships and responsibilities of board, administration and medical staff,
one to the other, have not been clearly defined and accepted by the
principals concerned. In general, physicians view the medical staff
organization as a separate "self-governing" entity-a term2 2 long
20. A few years ago, Herbert Dennenberg, while Insurance Commissioner
of Pennsylvania, had this as the number one point of his proposed
patient's bill of rights.
21. Williams, supra note 2, at 9.
22. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEw COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY defines "self-govern-
ing" as "autonomous: not subject to outside control." It is not dif-
ficult to understand why physicians consider this to mean that ad-
ministration and board must stay out of medical affairs. The author,
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used by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. On
their part, boards of trustees do not want to get involved in medi-
cal affairs. They like to assume that physicians will accept respon-
sibility for the professional practices of their confreres, and, there-
fore, that it is not necessary to challenge the members of the
medical staff. These attitudes can be attributed to a number of
factors: the trustees' lack of knowledge as to their expanding
responsibility for the quality of medical care provided by the physi-
cians to whom they have granted permission to practice in the
hospital; the physician mystique which so often intimidates trustees
and precludes them from applying clear cut accountability mechan-
isms to the medical staff; and the trustees' fears of becoming
involved in confrontation with physicians and feeling the brunt
of the raw power of the medical staff in the form of economic sanc-
tions and boycott of the hospital.
For many years there has been a vaguely defined, loose,
symbiotic, live-and-let-live relationship between board, administra-
tion and medical staff. The hospital literature has become replete
with terms attempting to define these vague relationships. There
has been built up a myth of implied equality, well-reflected in such
terms as three-legged stool, triad, triumvirate, triarchy, trilogy, tri-
partite. A senior official 23 of the Joint Commission on Hospital
Accreditation even went so far as to label it the trinity! As a result
of these myths, the roles of the respective parties have not been
understood, relationships have not been clearly defined and institu-
tional responsibilities not clearly pinpointed. While boards, ad-
ministrators and medical staffs may debate the issues of who is
actually responsible for the quality of medical care, who is in charge
of what, and who is to render accountability to whom the courts
do not appear to share these hang ups. It seems to this writer
that they have had no hesitation in pinpointing responsibility and
exacting institutional accountability when the responsibility for the
quality of medical care has not been properly discharged.
Why then should there be continuing difficulty in this area?
Why are not roles, relationships and responsibilities clearly de-
fined? Not all parties hear or interpret the messages of the court
and the public in the same manner. However, such differences
cannot be resolved at the local level until the major members of the
health care establishment-the American Hospital Association,
at the time of writing this article, saw a proposed draft of changes
for the J.C.A.H. Guidelines for Model Medical Staff By-Laws which
would delete the term. It remains to be seen if the proposed deletion
becomes permanent.
23. Carroll, J.C.A.H. Standards: Opportunities for Medical Staff Leader-
ship, 51 HoSPITAL PROGRESS 63, 64 (1970).
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American Medical Association, Catholic Hospital Association, Amer-
ican College of Hospital Administrators and the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals-recognize the problem and arrive at
a consensus on the matters referred to. Two of these organizations,
the Catholic Hospital Association 24 and the American College of
Hospital Administrators, 25 have come up with policy statements
designed to remove misunderstanding and confusion about the role
of the administrator as the institution's chief executive officer.
These documents carefully pinpoint responsibility on the chief ex-
ecutive officer for the effective management of the entire institu-
tion, including seeing that the medical staff organization carries
out the quality control functions established by the board. They
clearly delineate roles, relationships, responsibilities and lines of
accountability of the medical staff organization and its officials
vis-A-vis the board and administration. By so doing, these state-
ments potentially can minimize the quandary of the administrator;
however, they are only policy statements and are not binding on
an institution. Far more influential on an institution are the pres-
sure and influence that its medical staff, with the support of organ-
ized medicine, can bring to bear. As one would expect, these policy
statements have incurred the wrath of the American Medical Asso-
ciation.
IV. RESOLVING THE QUANDARY
The quandary of the hospital administrator boils down to who
is going to run the hospital. This problem is not new and there
is no magic formula for its resolution; however, there are some
approaches which should be considered.
A. Achieving Consensus Within the Establishment
If the major members of the establishment, the American Medi-
cal Association, American Hospital Association, American College
of Hospital Administrators, the Catholic Hospital Association and
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, were able to
reach consensus on defining the roles, relationships, responsibilities
and authority of the administrator, then the quandary might be
resolved because the members of each association would be hearing
the same message from their parent organization and there could
24. CATHOLIC HOSPITAL AssocIATIoN, GUIDELINES ON ROLES AND RELATION-
SHIPS OF BOARD, CHI=F EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND MEDICAL STAFF OF
CATHOLIC HOSPITAL AND LONG TERM CARE FACILITIES (1974).
25. TASK FORCE OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATORS,
RECOMMENDATIONS ON STANDARDS TO THE JOINT COMMISSION ON Ac-
cREDITATION OF HOSPITALS (May 24, 1974).
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be a commonality of concepts followed at the local level on the
contentious issues of controls, relationships and accountability of
the medical staff vis-A-vis the administrator.
Before this can be achieved, all parties must acknowledge that
a problem exists; however, the major hospital member of the estab-
lishment, the American Hospital Association, seems reluctant even
to acknowledge the problem. The same is not the case with the
major medical member of the establishment, the American Medical
Association. Two years ago, it squarely acknowledged to its
membership the existence of the problem and its worsening con-
dition.26 It has since mounted a unilateral course of action27 which
is coupled with its recent endorsement of collective bargaining for
physicians and the use of job action (withholding of services). Ne-
gotiation and withholding services are but a prelude to the use of
raw power, which involves confrontation, strike and economic boy-
cott of the hospital, and can only serve to aggravate further the
quandary of the administrator and perpetuate the road blocks to
effective management of the institution and its resources.
B. Time for Reappraisal
A major step in resolving this quandary is a reappraisal of the
medical staff organization as a quality control mechanism. Its
effectiveness has been and continues to be assailed from many
directions, yet the hospital continues to be the major site for setting
standards and regulating medical practice and sophisticated, compu-
terized medical information systems to ascertain whether con-
formity with those standards is available to the hospital. It is still
the major center for continuing education for most physicians once
they have completed their graduate education. However, there
has been little change in the basic form or relationships of the
medical staff organization in the fifty-seven years since 1919 when
it was first devised.
A proposed reappraisal of the organization should not be under-
taken by constituent members of the medical-hospital establish-
ment. To do so would be self-serving and would no doubt ensure
a perpetuation of the existing problems. A prestigious university,
one of the major health care foundations, the Institute of Medicine
26. AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, Feb. 4, 1974, at 9. This article dealt with
who is running the hospital. The debate over this issue is intensive.
27. NEW AMA NEGOTIATIONS DEPARTMENT, WHAT You DON'T KNOW ABOUT
THE ART OF NEGOTIATING Is HURTING YOU (Nov. 1975). This focuses
quite clearly on the problems. "Friction between hospital governing
boards and medical staffs. The disagreements are increasing. One
major difficulty concerns the rules under which the medical staff
operates in the hospital." Id. at 1.
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of the National Academy of Sciences, a governmental agency, or
a similar institution should sponsor such an undertaking.
C. The Likelihood of Outside Forces
The impact of court decisions regarding malpractice will
continue to have an educative effect on hospital trustees. As they
recognize the magnitude of their corporate responsibility, they will
be forced to focus on and attempt to define more clearly the role
of the administrator, their legal representative in charge of the
hospital. As steps are taken to resolve the malpractice crisis, we
can expect to see the hospital's responsibility for the quality of
medical care more carefully and clearly delineated, as occurred in
the recent Ravenis case.28 This too will serve further to alert
trustees to their awesome corporate responsibility regarding the
provision of medical care at acceptable standards. However, it will
also aggravate the problem over who is responsible for quality con-
trol and the boards will come into confrontation with their medi-
cal staffs.
One must also consider the likelihood of federal authorities im-
posing regulations that will strengthen the authority of boards and
administrators and force medical staffs to be organized along cer-
tain lines to permit more effective management of hospitals. The
withholding of services by physicians, the boycott of hospitals, the
resistance of the profession to rendering accountability and its
apparent inability or reluctance to police its own ranks have made
it the logical target for federal action. The following illustrates
how federal agencies are exhibiting an increasing interest in the
affairs of organized medicine: the anti-trust suit over fee schedules
filed by the Justice Department against the American Society of
Anaesthesiologists; the Justice Department's inquiry into the Amer-
ican College of Radiology's relative value fee scale; the Federal
Trade Commission's challenge to the American Medical Associa-
tion's ethical prohibition on advertising by physicians, and its
investigations to determine the extent of the control exercised by
physicians over the nation's seventy-one Blue Shield Plans and to
determine whether the American Medical Association has used its
influence to restrain illegally the supply of physicians and to retard
28. Ravenis v. Detroit General Hospital, 234 N.W.2d 411 (Mich. Ct. App.
1975). Two recipients of transplants (from the same donor) §ub-
sequently lost sight in their transplanted eyes because the transplants
were infected. Apparently the hospital lacked written checklists or
guidelines to ascertain the suitability of prospective donors. The
hospital was found liable for negligence in determining the donor,
whereas the opthamology resident who actually removed the trans-
plant material from the donor was found to be not negligent.
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the development of alternative forms of health care delivery. In
view of this, it is not at all inconceivable that federal agencies will
turn their attention to hospitals.
D. A Separate Corporation? A Union?
From time to time one hears physicians suggest that the medical
staff organization should be a separate corporation, in no way
beholden to administration or to a "lay board of trustees who know
nothing about medicine." Contrary to what physicians might think,
this would not make life any easier for them. They would still
need an administration for their own corporation, and with the
channels of accountability flowing more directly to the consumer,
the resulting regulation of their activities would likely be more
stringent. Certainly, in setting up a separate corporation, there
would be legal hurdles to be overcome, such as the concept of cor-
porate responsibility for the quality of medical care which was
established by Darling.
While at first glance, such a proposal presents problems, this
approach should be studied since the fact remains that the present
system is inadequate. The present trend toward forming physician
unions is actually a development in the establishment of a separate
medical staff corporation. While the union movement will prob-
ably continue, it is doubtful that the deep-seated feelings and
antagonisms toward unions can be sufficiently overcome for the
profession to subscribe to the concept of a separate corporation
under union control. For this reason, if a separate corporate model
for the medical staff is developed, it will likely be under other than
union control.
It is of interest to examine some of the implications for board
and administration which are presented by a separate corporate
medical staff model, regardless of whether it be under the aegis
of the physician members themselves or a union. Such a separate
corporate model divorced from the rest of the institution at least
has the merit of potentially being the means whereby responsibility
could be imposed in an understandable manner. It could help re-
solve the administrator's quandary because the board and adminis-
tration would be relieved of the sensitive and conflict-laden situa-
tion of having to interject themselves into disciplinary matters
when the physicians would not act. The board in effect would
relinquish to the medical staff corporation its responsibility for and
control of the quality of medical care. The quid pro quo would
have to be a guarantee to the hospital board by the medical staff
corporation of a multimillion dollar insurance protection to cover
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any situation in which the hospital might be found liable for the
negligence of a member of the medical staff corporation.
The existence of a separate medical staff corporation could pro-
vide incentives to its members to self-govern more effectively and
to police their ranks. However, with the responsibility for the qual-
ity of medical care (a responsibility physicians have long claimed
is theirs) clearly resting in the medical staff corporation, it would
become the logical target for suits alleging negligence on the part
of a physician and might have to pay out large judgments. The
medical staff corporation would have to provide malpractice insur-
ance coverage for all of its members. Presumably the premium
would be experience-rated, thus providing an incentive for the
members of the corporation to do something about their confreres
whose patterns of practice cost them money through increased pre-
miums.
The medical staff corporation could be directly accountable to
the public through the state licensing board (hopefully one that
is consumer-oriented) and also answerable through the courts and
the public media. There could be a written working agreement
between the hospital and the medical staff corporation requiring
that the hospital administrator report in writing to the administra-
tion of the corporation all instances in which its members do not
adhere to predetermined professional standards or do not abide by
hospital policies; all patterns of practice that come into question
for any reason; every incident involving a physician which in any
way tended to jeopardize the safety of the patient; all aberrant
incidents of behavior occasioned by health or social habits; and all
the other dimensions of routine quality controls. Thus the medical
staff corporation could be kept fully informed so that it could carry
out meaningful self-government and surveillance of the practices
of all its members with a view to making sure that the safety of
the patient always came first. As an added incentive to that end,
the administrator should be required under the terms of the con-
tractual agreement to forward copies of all such reports to the state
licensing board and to the medical staff corporation's insurance
carrier (s).
Costly? Practical? Effective? Who knows? It is mentioned
here as one approach that merits further study, if only to point
up the advantages and disadvantages to those who regard a separate
corporation as a means of being freed up from hospital boards
and administrator controls; or to show them the advantages of the
present system and elicit their cooperation to make it work more
effectively. A recent New Jersey appellate court decision,29 which
29. Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hospital, 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534
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states that the entire medical staff of a hospital may be held liable
for allowing an allegedly incompetent physician to continue to do
surgery, seems to point the way to the medical staff's being consid-
ered a separate corporate entity. Group liability can be an incen-
tive for the members of a medical staff to police their brethren more
effectively and can also serve as a logical basis for physicians to
contend that if they can be sued collectively, then they should be
able to have their own separate corporate entity.
The quandary of the hospital administrator is a symptom of the
long-standing tripartite system of hospital governance which no
longer permits the management process to be applied effectively.
Up until a decade ago, the relationships of the board, administration
and medical staff were held together by the glue of goodwill. But
today, with the ever-increasing societal pressures building up on
each of those three members, the glue of goodwill alone no longer
has the adhesive power to maintain the proper relationships and get
the job done. They now have to be reappraised and carefully deline-
ated. Continued reluctance and inability on the part of members
of the medical hospital establishment to face up to the administra-
tor's quandary of who is running the hospital will make it necessary
for the courts to resolve the problem.
(1975). The action was brought against the hospital's board and the
administrator, as well as the hospital medical staff, alleging that they
permitted a member of the medical staff who was not competent to
perform a particular surgical procedure to continue to treat the pa-
tient after his incompetence had become obvious. The court ruled
that all 141 members of the medical staff could be sued collectively,
even though they were only members of an unincorporated asso-
ciation.
